中国防火墙（GFW）于2025年9月11日发生了历史上最大规模的内部文件泄露事件，涉及超过500GB的源代码、工作日志和内部通信记录。这些泄露文件揭示了GFW的研究、开发和运营细节，源自其核心技术团队。

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1. Geedge公司的监控与审查技术

   • 评论1指出，Geedge公司自2018年成立以来，向哈萨克斯坦、埃塞俄比亚和缅甸等国家出售了类似中国“防火长城”的监控工具，用于过滤和监控网络流量，并阻止VPN的使用。
   • 引用：“The same tool has been rolled out in Ethiopia and Myanmar, where it has been instrumental in enabling that country’s military junta to enforce a ban on VPNs.”
   • 引用：“The leaks show employees at the company working to reverse-engineer many popular tools and find means of blocking them.”

2. 西方国家对类似防火墙的潜在采用

   • 评论2认为，尽管西方国家目前没有积极构建类似“防火长城”的系统，但整体趋势正在向更多政府干预和审查的方向发展。
   • 引用：“But the truth is that we are moving more towards such a system then we are moving away.”
   • 引用：“Internet seems to be losing the battle against government interference and censorship.”

3. 技术对抗与审查的博弈

   • 评论4分享了个人通过技术手段绕过防火墙的经验，例如使用ROT13加密、伪装HTTP流量等，并指出防火墙逐渐升级了检测手段。
   • 引用：“I would pass my SSH connecting used for socks5 through ROT13 or any ROTn, then the firewall won’t gradually slow it down.”
   • 引用：“Unknown protocols were stalled after a few kilobytes. I then learned if I pretend I’m doing something legitimate such as downloading favicon.ico within a proper HTTP channel, they won’t touch my ‘packets’.”

4. QUIC协议的审查挑战

   • 评论3提出疑问，探讨“防火长城”如何处理QUIC流量，是否完全屏蔽或仍能过滤。
   • 引用：“AFAIK QUIC traffic is impossible to attack using MITM techniques. So I wonder how the GFW handles it.”